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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a radical reinterpretation of the argument in Nicomachean Ethics 
iii 5 concerning responsibility for character. I argue that what is at stake is the new 
standard of liability Aristotle is introducing there, the so-called "negligence" standard, 
and that the scope of the discussion is limited to the class of agents who are negligent 
through an inability to take care. Thus, I argue, there is no claim being made that in 
general responsibility for acts requires responsibility for character. 
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF NICOMACHEAN ETHICS iiiS TO 
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Responsibility (aitia) is for Aristotle a kind of causal (aitos) relationship between an 
agent and an item of conduct or product of conduct. The indications are that he regards 
responsibility in this sense as creating liability to both legal and non-legal sanctions, the latter 
including what we would call moral praise and blame. These different forms of liability are 
nowadays often spoken of as different kinds of responsibility, sometimes with the implication 
that they are created by different sets of facts, but this way of speaking is not found in 
Aristotle. He does not distinguish moral responsibility from legal responsibility, nor either of 
these from mere causal responsibility. He does not, as far as I can tell, ever use any Greek 
equivalent of the expression "moral responsibility." 
It is somewhat surprising, then, that interpreters of Aristotle should so often read his 
account of responsibility as an account of moral responsibility in the modern, if ill-defined, 
sense of the expression. For not only is this not warranted by the forms of expression 
Aristotle uses, it is at odds with what one would expect given Aristotle's philosophical 
method and what we know about responsibility in Athenian life and thought. His method, as 
he says (EN 1145b2-8)1, is to 
set the phenomena (phainomena) before us, and by working through the puzzles 
(diaporesantas) prove, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold (ta endoxa) 
about these ... or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for 
if we both resolve the difficulties and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we 
shall have proved the case sufficiently. 
What, in Aristotle's world, were the phenomena of responsibility, and what puzzles did they 
exhibit? What opinions regarding responsibility would he have felt obliged to entertain and, 
if possible, redeem? These questions, though not at all difficult to answer, have not received 
adequate attention. The all too frequent result is that Aristotle has been anachronistically 
assumed .. to have an- interest -in responsibility that is akin to the modern moral philosopher's. 
He is read as having a significantly metaphysical interest in moral responsibility, whereas the 
historical evidence available to us suggests something very different. It suggests that his 
general conception of responsibility as a kind of causal relationship was a reflection of the 
character of arguments about responsibility found in Athenian life, and especially in the 
Athenian courts.2 There is reason to think, moreover, that a central concern of Aristotle's 
was to impose some philosophically coherent regularity on the evolving and subtly 
inconsistent standards used by those courts; for historians of law credit him with the first 
formulation of the "negligence" standard of liability, a standard which came to be embodied 
in the bonus pater jamilias of the Roman law and the "reasonable man" of the English and 
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American law of torts.3 Again, this is not to say that we should take Aristotle to be 
expounding an account of legal responsibility rather than moral responsibility, for it would 
seem that this distinction had not yet been invented.4 We should, however, expect his 
conception of responsibility to be similar in some respects to the conception of responsibility 
embodied in the negligence standard belonging to the common law of torts, and we should be 
mindful of his status as an innovative legal theorist, especially in interpreting those passages 
in which he anticipates and answers objections to his views on responsibility. 
I. 
I want to focus on what I take to be the least understood of Aristotle's remarks on 
responsibility, which are those occurring in EN iii S, where he says that virtues are states of 
character which "are in our power and voluntary" (I 1 14b29-30). In arguing this he appears 
to concede that an agent would not be responsible for what he does if he were not also 
responsible for having the state of character that explains his doing what he does. He also 
appears to argue that we are all of us responsible for having the characters we do, when he 
insists that character arises through the agent's own voluntary actions. Understood this way, 
he exposes himself to devastating objections, for he seems to hold that an agent, A, is not the 
(responsible) source of any x, unless A is the source of the source of x, and that A does not 
have control over the producing of x, if x is produced by facts about A which A has never 
had control over. This is tantamount to holding that A is not responsible for any x, unless A 
is radically responsible for x. That is, it amounts to holding that for A to be responsible for 
x, A must be the uncaused cause of x, and A's producing x must be unconditionally 
avoidable. But if Aristotle really believes that responsibility requires all this, and he is trying 
to satisfy these requirements by showing that we are all of us responsible for having the 
characters we do, then his account is lamentably inept. 
It would be inept because if one concedes that action determined by the agent's state 
of character would not be avoidable in the way required for responsibility, then to argue that 
responsibility is possible because a time exists at which the character is not yet formed, 
invites the objection, as Hardie pointed out some years ago, that "if the earlier actions cannot 
be traced to character, they can be traced to the joint efficacy of natural innate tendencies 
and environmental influences."S The argument seems, as he says, "to skate over some thin 
ice.,,6 
-So does.·Aristotle make concessions here that doom his account of responsibility, or can 
these difficulties be resolved? One way of dealing with this question, a not uncommon one 
among those who take Aristotle to be a reconciling determinist, is to simply ignore it and 
focus on other texts. Of those who do grapple with this question, however, there is 
widespread agreement that Aristotle does concede that unless one is responsible for one's 
character, one cannot be responsible for one's actions. They agree on this, but disagree about 
whether this answer to the objection is adequate<or not. My own view, which I shall defend 
in what follows, is that the concession Aristotle makes is quite different from the one he is 
commonly thought to make, and that the account of responsibility this leaves him with is 
essentially sound. I will argue that the nature of the objection he responds to has been 
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misidentified, indeed that the topic of the crucial passages has not even been correctly 
identified. 
I will begin by sketching out the broad contours of Aristotle's account of 
responsibility, and will then, in proceeding to a detailed consideration of EN iii 5, consider 
the recent argument of Irwin's that (on the standard reading) "a reasonable defense of 
Aristotle's claim about responsibility for character" is possible.7 This defense is not one that 
Aristotle could have endorsed, I think, and it will be illuminating to see why. 
II. 
It is obvious that responsibility and voluntariness are closely linked in the EN, but 
what the relationship is exactly is less clear, and perhaps less clear still is what the nature of 
either of these is, positively speaking. Considerable confusion has been created, no doubt, by 
the fact that in the EN there is a great deal of attention devoted to involuntariness, so that 
the definition of voluntariness seems to derive from it; but this confusion can be rectified 
through a closer reading of the EN itself, as well as through a comparison with the Magna 
M oralia (MM) and the Eudemian Ethics (EE), both of which proceed by defining voluntary 
action before involuntary action, and not in terms of it.8 
I said at the outset that responsibility (aitia) is for Aristotle a kind of causal (aitos) 
relationship between an agent and an item of conduct or product of conduct, and we can see 
this in his remark in EN iii 5 that "man is a moving principle or begetter of his actions as of 
children" (ll13b 18-19). This remark might be dismissed as hasty and not indicative of his 
views, except that the same idea recurs at greater length in both of the earlier works, and we 
have no reason to think he has changed his mind on this point. It appears in EE ii 6 as 
follows (l222b 16-30): 
Every substance is by nature a sort of principle; therefore each can produce many 
similar to itself, as man man, animals in general animals, and plants plants. But in 
addition to this man alone of animals is also the source of certain actions; ... as 
elsewhere, the source or principle is the cause of all that exists through it. 
Following this he says that praise and blame are given "only for what we ourselves are causes 
of, ... that excellence and badness have to do with matters where the man himself is the 
cause and source of his acts" (1223a 11-15). Here we see first the claim that only human 
. beings are capable of action, and further the implied claim that this is the case because no 
other kind of creature is so constituted as to be the right kind of source of motion. Besides 
this general requirement for being properly subject to attributions of responsibility, namely 
that the subject of those attributions be capable of action, we see the further requirement 
that we can only be properly held responsible for those particular things that we are the 
"cause and source" of. We will need to consider each of these requirements in turn after 
noting what Aristotle says about biological begetting in the MM. 
There are many indications that in the MM Aristotle is expending more energy in 
trying to put distance between himself and Socrates than he does in the later works, and also 
that he has made far less progress in coming to grips with the confused state of Athenian 
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law. And so, when the metaphor of biological begetting appears in the MM it is in 
responding directly to the Socratic doctrine that "to be good or bad does not rest with us to 
come about" (1187a 6-7), and it is without the explicit talk about causation that we see in the 
EE, and which was abundant and of central importance in the Athenian courts by the start of 
the fourth century? It is quite interesting, however, that in the MM we are told that action 
springs from principles in much the way that a tree springs from a seed, the seed being "a 
kind of principle (arche),' (1187a 33-34). A seed, of course, is the origin of a tree without 
being a radical or absolutely original origin. This is consistent with the EN statement that 
we beget our actions as we do our children, and it suggests, even at this early point in our 
inquiry, that whatever Aristotle concedes to the objector in EN iii 5, it is not, as Hardie 
suggests, that "the agent's activity, although a moving principle, is not an original or 
spontaneous principle of movement, [since it is determined by character].,,10 
To continue, however, we must ask what it is about human beings that makes them 
alone capable of action, and thereby subject in general to judgments of responsibility. A 
good place to start is with Aristotle's remarks regarding children and other animals, for there 
we find an account of the abilities of normal adults, i.e. fully developed human beings which 
make them, but not other animals and children, full-fledged agents who are properly 
regarded as in general responsible for what they do. These abilities come under the heading 
of choice or decision (prohairesis), which animals are incapable of because they lack 
"deliberative imagination" (DA 434a5-10). Both children and animals act from appetite, or 
simple desire, he implies (EN 111Ia24-27), whereas "when we have decided as a result of 
deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation" (EN 1113aI2-13). Deliberation, as 
Aristotle describes it, is probably best understood as a process that includes identification of 
the constituents of an end, 11 as well as selection of means that are appropriate to an end (EN 
1112b13), and involving the ability to recognize and respond to the relevance of various 
relevant considerations (EN 1140b5-6 and 16-21). Since this is a sophisticated form of 
reasoning that deliberation requires, it appears that in lacking mature powers of reasoning, 
children must lack something essential for responsibility. 
Besides reasoning or thought, choice also requires character which children lack at least 
by-and-large, since it is formed over time through "activities exercised on particular objects" 
(EN 1105bIO-12). "The origin (arche) of action," Aristotle says (EN 1139a32- 1139b5): 
... is choice (prohairesis), and that of choice is desire (orexis) and reasoning with a 
view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without thought (dianoia) and 
intellect or without a state of character (ethikes ... hexeos); for good action and 
its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect 
itself, however, moves nothing, but only intellect which aims at an end and is 
practical ... Hence choice is either desiderative thought or intellectual desire, and 
such an origin of action is a man (kai toiaute arche anthropos). 
So it is having the capacity for choice or decision that makes fully developed human beings 
sources of action, and not merely sources of motion, and this capacity for choice requires a 
capacity for reasoning and a state of character. Why reasoning is essential is clear, but we 
might wonder why a state of character is essential as well. Aristotle's answer to this seems to 
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be, as he says, that intellect alone "moves nothing, but only intellect which aims at an end 
and is practical." Now "each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the 
pleasant" (EN ll13a 31-32), its own ideas of the proper ends of action, and so a state of 
character provides reason with a conceptualized structure of ends which it can engage with in 
a way that will yield a decision that can move the agent. Where there is no state of 
character, the only possibility, apparently, is to act on the desire that is strongest at the time 
of action. This makes it clear, too, why it is only those who are capable of choice and action 
who can be properly judged responsible in a liability-creating sense. For if one can only act 
on the strongest desire of the moment, then one is moved in a way that is not at any time 
subject to the constraint of other considerations, including those pertaining to justice. In 
lacking the ability to recognize and respond to the relevance of various relevant 
considerations, one would have no ability to conform oneself to objective standards of 
conduct that might conflict with one's strongest desire of the moment. The upshot of this, 
which is very important for our purposes here, is that responsibility requires a state of 
character, since responsibility requires a capacity for choice, and the capacity for choice 
requires a state of character. 
Before we turn from this general condition for responsibility to the idea that we are 
responsible for just those things that have their source in us, it will be useful to consider 
Aristotle's remarks in Metaphysics ix on creatures "that can produce change according to a 
rational formula" (Met. l047b 36-37). This is relevant to our earlier discussion of the image 
of biological begetting, and what it shows about the kind of origin of action Aristotle takes a 
person to be, for he explains there the sense in which a self -mover which produces motion 
"according to a rational formula" is capable of doing what it does. Thought or intellect in 
itself generates "contrary effects", he says, and so "intellect itself ... moves nothing" (EN 
l139a 35-36). Action requires a choice from among the competing plans of action generated 
by the intellect, and this depends on desire (Met. l048aIO-24, emphasis added): 
That which decides, then, must be somethIng else; I mean by this desire or choice. 
For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is in 
the circumstances appropriate to the potentiality in question and meets the passive 
object. Therefore everything which has a rational potentiality, when it desires that 
for which it has a potentiality and in the circumstances in which it has it, must do 
this. And it has the potentiality in question when the passive object is present and is 
in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act. 
Thus he here insists that action from choice, originating as it does in thought and a state of 
desire (state of character involving a conception of the good) is necessitated. Desire 
necessitates action when it supplies an end for which deliberative reason can, and will, 
recommend means (i.e., a plan) of action. This conforms to his statement at Met. vi 3 
(1 027b7 -8) that "everything, ... that is to be, will be of necessity," and makes it clear that 
Aristotle's account can only be consistent with a conditional account of the ability to do other 
than what we do. 12 If one is "capable" of doing x, at time, t, in circumstances, c, then one 
"must do" x, Aristotle says; and so he would be compelled to add, if the question arose, that 
for one to be capable of not doing x at t in c, one would have to be different in some 
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respect. 
There is a perfectly straightforward sense of what we "can" do, of course, in which 
"possible things are those," as Aristotle says (EN 1112b 27), "that might be brought about 
through us." In this sense, what we can do is whatever is permitted by our abilities and 
opportunities; whatever, that is to say, is determined by the structure of our ends and not by 
a lack of ability or opportunity. For a person, we find Aristotle saying, is the kind of source 
of movement in whom a state of desire for the perceived good is decisive and produces its 
results through the means selected by thought. And this is tantamount to saying that it is 
through the instrumentality of the intellect that character expresses itself in action, so that it 
would seem to be the dependency of differences in conduct on the agent's state of character 
(taking the mediation of the agent's reason for granted) that makes that conduct the agent's 
and not the product of something else. We saw earlier that Aristotle identifies decision or 
choice as the source of action, and yet I think he will not restrict that which has its source in 
us, and so what we can be responsible for, to that which is chosen. If an agent causes harm 
without choosing to do so, but does so in a way that reflects and springs from a defective 
character, then the agent may be regarded as the source and cause of the harm, and so as 
responsible for it, if we regard character and the conception of ends belonging to it as the 
originating seat of agency. This is not inconsistent with Aristotle's views, I think, for in 
addition to the evidence of Met. ix, he says at EN vi 5, that "the origin of what is done is 
that for the sake of which it is done" (1l40b 15-16).13 To pursue this any further, however, 
we must take up the question of what the relationship is between responsibility and 
voluntariness. 
III 
It is widely agreed that Aristotle takes involuntary actions to be ones for which we are 
not responsible; they are attributable either to compulsion "of which the moving principle is 
outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is acted 
upon" (EN 11 lOa 1-3), or to ignorance of the particular circumstances of the action. What is 
less often noticed, however, is that Aristotle does not regard us as only responsible for what 
we do voluntarily. The existence of a third category of actions, which are neither voluntary 
nor involuntary, arises because it is possible to distinguish (as he does at EN l135b16-l9) 
between ignorance that originates in the agent, through the agent's fault, and ignorance 
which has its origin outside of the agent. The kind of ignorance that makes an act 
involuntary must be ignorance that originates outside of the agent, for otherwise the act does 
have its origin and cause in the agent. Yet voluntariness requires knowledge of the 
circumstances (EN lllla22-24), so when an act is done in ignorance of the circumstances of 
action, and that ignorance is the agent's own fault, then responsibility arises because the act 
and any resulting harm have their source and cause in the agent, even though the act is not 
voluntary. 
So we find Aristotle distinguishing involuntary acts done by reason of ignorance, or 
caused by ignorance, from acts done "in" ignorance; though he never gives us a name in the 
language of voluntariness (hekousion) for this category of action that is neither voluntary nor 
involuntary. (The "non-voluntary" (oukh hekon at EN 1110b24) is a category arising from a 
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different distinction which does not concern us here. The category of mistake (hamartama) 
which he identifies at EN 113Sb18-20 is a subclass of the category we are concerned with 
here.) The distinction is introduced in EN iii 1 in the following way (lIIOb2S-27): 
Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; 
for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance 
but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. 
It is later, at EN 1113 b30-1114a2, that Aristotle indicates that the source of action in 
ignorance is in the agent, and that the agent is properly held accountable for such action: 
we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is thought responsible for his 
ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the moving 
principle is in the man himself, since he had the power of not getting drunk and his 
getting drunk was the cause of his ignorance. And we punish those who are ignorant 
of anything in the laws that they ought to know and that is not difficult, and so too 
in the case of anything else that they are thought to be ignorant of through 
carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since they have 
the power of taking care. 
Aristotle is here, in what is regarded as a definition of negligence,14 driving home the point 
that culpable ignorance is itself blameworthy, but clearly he also has in mind that what one 
does in ignorance is blameworthy. Penalties are doubled for acts of aggression in a drunken 
state, for instance, and not for mere uneventful ignorance of facts. A similar passage occurs 
at EE 122Sb9-17, and in it too the point is driven home that responsibility can arise through 
carelessness, even without voluntariness, if the knowledge of circumstances requisite for 
voluntariness is absent owing to carelessness. 
So clearly Aristotle does not want to restrict responsibility to voluntary action, as is 
sometimes thought. IS He thinks we are responsible for some action that is not voluntary as 
well, a thought he exploits artfully in arguing that akratic action is blameworthy because it is 
not involuntary. Akratic acts are performed in ignorance of particular features of their 
circumstances, he suggests (EN 1147b6-8), such ignorance being due to the influence of 
passion (EN 1147aI7-22). He suggests, furthermore, that the possibility of passion having 
such influence stems from moral defect in the form of an akratic character (EN vii 4). In 
short, then, Aristotle thinks that people are responsible for akratic actions despite the 
ignorance of circumstances he believes to be involved in such actions, because it is an akratic 
character that explains akratic action.I 6 This is in conformity with the thesis that "the 
responsible" for Aristotle "would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the 
agent himself," she being an origin of action, and not just any kind of self-mover. Voluntari-
ness requires, in addition, that the agent be "aware of the particular circumstances of the 
action," but responsibility does not require this, so reference to the agent's state of awareness 
of the circumstances can simply drop out, in identifying the conditions of responsibility. 
It follows from this that an agent may be responsible for something without having 
decided to bring it about, or having forseen its coming about, provided its source and cause 
8 
is the agent's character acting through the mediation of the agent's intellect. This can come 
about, indeed must come about routinely, because deliberation that consciously and 
errorIessly matches means to ends is not the only causal path by which an agent's character 
may express itself in action. It is not the only means by which the structure of an agent's 
ends may come to be reflected in action that satisfies those ends. We have seen this already in 
Aristotle's treatment of akrasia; the akratic agent acts against his deliberated judgment, and 
yet may be held responsible because his character is the cause of what he does. Furthermore, 
when the akratic (or self-indulgent) agent ignores his deliberations (or fails to carry them out 
to begin with), the resulting conduct is not merely caused by his character, but also satisfies 
a desire that the agent puts before, though does not judge more important than, others. We 
have here, in effect, at least part of a theory of negligence: a theory, that is, which justifies 
on the basis of an underlying concept of responsibility, a standard of liability which does not 
require culpable intent, if a wrong has arisen through a failure to exercise due care. 
It may also be argued on Aristotle's behalf (and this would amount to a decision-
theoretic partial theory of negligence) that it is inescapable that what agents don't care about 
will come to be reflected in their conduct and its consequences, even though most of those 
consequences are not consciously intended. This is so, because we cannot investigate the 
credentials of our beliefs endlessly, nor deliberate about every aspect of an action; we must 
be selective, and to the extent that the selection is rational it will reflect what matters to us 
(i.e., what we care about). But then, through our differential exercise of care, we come to 
advance certain interests or. ends at the expense of others, though not in a way that is 
intentional in all respects. To make our action more fully intentional (i.e., intentional in 
more respects) could only be a waste of time and resources; it would require a less efficient 
manner of administering to the desires we have. Efficiency in this administration is arguably 
an important component of rationality, and so it would be absurd to protest that conduct that 
effectively satisfies a set of desires is not rational unless it is mediated by a conscious process 
of choice, or a rational will that issues volitions. But then, appetite and passion may (and 
often do) move us to do what is rational for us to do, this also being in general what we 
would desire to do after deliberating, if we deliberated. So it would be absurd to hold, and 
Aristotle would seem to deny, that an action originates in character mediated by the agent's 
intellect, only when mediated in the "standard" full-blown way by the conscious exercise of 
practical reason. 1 7 
IV. 
We are now in a position to consider EN iii 5 and Irwin's defense of Aristotle's position 
according to the standard reading. At EN 1114a6-13 Aristotle looks to be arguing that no one 
comes to have the character he does but through choosing it, and so Irwin takes the central 
claim to be that "most adults ... are still capable of effective deliberation about the sort of 
people they should be,,,18 and so can be praised or blamed for the states of character they 
come to have. This looks quite plausible indeed, but there are reasons to think this is not 
Aristotle's view. One reason can be found in the circumstance that he cannot claim that 
deliberation in the absence of enduring character suffices for responsibility. Also, it is 
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troublesome that elsewhere in the EN he does not seem to think that adults can deliberate 
effectively about their character. 
The first point is straightforward. As we have seen, choice requires not just reasoning, 
but also a state of character (EN 1139a32-b5), for otherwise the source of movement is not 
the kind involved in responsible agency. That is, Aristotle would almost certainly agree with 
the claim that the acquisition of a state of character cannot be credited to an agent in whom 
no state of character has yet developed, even if it arises with foreknowledge and through the 
agent's voluntary actions. He would not concede that those actions arise through external· 
causes, as Hardie's objector suggests, for a person without a character is nevertheless a 
moving principle of a different kind; yet that person is not the kind of moving principle to 
which judgments of responsibility may be applied. So whatever Aristotle's intentions are in 
EN iii 5, he cannot, without inconsistency, mean to be arguing that people are usually 
responsible for coming to have the characters they do. They cannot be responsible for their 
first state of character, and we can hardly suppose that he means to be arguing that people 
usually or always progress beyond their first enduring states of character, acquiring 
subsequent ones. 
Regarding the claim that adults can deliberate effectively about their character, it must 
be observed that one can only effectively deliberate with respect to a possible outcome of 
one's action if one can contemplate such an outcome; one cannot wish, or aim, for things that 
one cannot conceive of. So we could not count someone as effectively deliberating about 
what kind of character to have simply on account of his wishing to be vicious, and doing 
vicious deeds in order to become so; if he cannot conceive of what it would be like to be 
virtuous, then he has not chosen viciousness over virtue, and could not have chosen to be 
virtuous. Now at EN 1179b7 -15 Aristotle says of arguments, that they 
seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the 
young, and to make a character which is gently born ... ready to be possessed by 
excellence, [but] they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. 
For these do not by their nature obey the sense of shame ... and have not even a 
conception (ennoian) of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted 
it. 
In light of Aristotle's empiricist principle that all thought derives from sense experience, 19 
we can infer from the final clause (literally "[the many] being without a taste of them [the 
noble and truly pleasant]" (ageustoi ontes)), that we are to understand the claim that most 
people lack a conception of nobility and goodness quite literally. Given this claim, Aristotle 
could not hold that they can choose to become virtuous; if they are impervious to the 
arguments of others, then neither could they stimulate themselves to virtue by reasoning with 
themselves (i.e., by deliberating). Moreover, Aristotle suggests here that this common lack of 
receptivity to reason and feelings of shame is explained by the endowments of birth. 
Following and developing this line of thought is an examination of opinions concerning 
the origins of goodness (EN 1179b20-21): "Now some think that we are made good by nature, 
others by habituation, others by teaching." Aristotle's position on this seems to be that these 
opinions are all in part correct, and all of them also wrong, in that the cooperation of all 
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three of these influences is essential to becoming virtuous. "Perhaps we must be content," he 
says (l179blS-19), "if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are 
present, we get some tincture of excellence." Argument and teaching cannot in themselves be 
the origins of virtue, he argues (l179b26-30): 
For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor 
understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his 
ways? ... The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to 
excellence, loving what is noble and hating what is base. 
The character "must somehow be there already," he says. Far from suggesting that it can get 
there through the unaided powers of the deliberating individual (the individual who can 
reason with himself), nor even with complete certainty through the efforts of the family and 
community to impose desirable habits, he argues simply that a necessary condition for the 
emergence of virtuous character is the regulation of "nurture and occupation" by a system of 
just laws.20 "It is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not 
been brought up under right laws," he says (EN 1179b31-32), adding (lISOal-4) that 
it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right nurture 
and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practice and be 
habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to 
cover the whole of life; ... 
But though such a comprehensive scheme of laws is necessary, and is something the 
community ought to enact,2l Aristotle does not suggest that with this assistance we would all 
have it in our power to be good. Nor does he suggest that even the expert legislator has the 
ability to make everyone better through his care: "if anyone can do it," he says (EN IlSOb26-
28), "it is the man who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which give scope for 
care and prudence." But he does not affirm that antecedent; he does not say that anyone can 
do this, only that the best person for the job is one who has learned to legislate. Even the 
best legislator will be unable to provide everyone with the prerequisites of excellence, given 
facts of economic necessity and vulnerability to conditions creating cultural instability.22 
In light of the role that Aristotle assigns to the influence of nurture and occupation, it 
would seem that whatever he means to be arguing in EN iii 5, his considered judgment is not 
that it is generally true that people can effectively deliberate about and control the states of 
character they come to have.23 They can make themselves better, perhaps, but only within 
limits. As he says in MM i 11, "he who chooses to be best will not be so, unless nature also 
is presupposed; better, however, he will be." Nor, as I've argued, can his considered 
judgment be that people are in general responsible for having the characters they do. Thus 
we must wonder whether the standard reading of iii 5 is perhaps mistaken, or be prepared to 
discount what Aristotle says in that section as an inconsistent departure from the body of his 
account. As I've indicated, I will follow the former course here, taking Aristotle's motives 
and his conclusions to be very different from what they may seem to be.24 
II 
v 
Section iii 5 begins as follows (I113b3-9): 
The end, then, being what we wish for, the things contributing to the end what we 
deliberate about and choose, actions concerning the latter must be according to 
choice and voluntary. Now the exercise of the excellences is concerned with these. 
Therefore excellence also is in our power, and so too vice. For where it is in our 
power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; ... 
In the preceding section Aristotle has just said (I 113a30-31) that "each state of character has 
its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant," thus associating character with ends or what we 
wish for. So he is here contrasting character as such, which concerns ends, with the 
"exercise" or expression of character (the virtues) in action. The latter concerns means or 
what contributes to the end, and so is voluntary and in our power, he says. The balance of 
the section up to 1114a4 continues this theme of the power we have to do different kinds of 
actions, and it is at 1113bI7-18, in response to the Socratic dictum that "no one is voluntarily 
wicked or involuntarily blessed," that a man is described as "a moving principle or begetter of 
his actions as of children." This is the same pattern of argument we saw in the MM, and 
again, this suggests that in general one need not be the source of· the source in oneself of 
one's actions, in order to be the source of one's actions; anymore than one must be one's own 
parent in order to be the parent of one's child. Following this, Aristotle makes the 
observation that responsiblity attaches even to what is done through carelessness and in the 
absence of foreknowledge, and this leads into the first of two rounds of objections and 
replies, running from 1114a3 to 31, and from there to 1114b25. The balance of the section 
(1114b26-1115a6) consists of a summary of what has been shown of virtues in general, and 
an indication that the discussion will turn from virtue in general to the several particular 
virtues. 
I will argue now that what I have called the standard reading of this section depends on 
failing to attend to the distinct dialectical purposes generated by the two rather different 
objections Aristotle entertains. The first of these objections I take to be a challenge to the 
claim that we are responsible for what we do when acting in ignorance arising from 
-carelessness: "But perhaps," the objector says (1114a3), Ita man is the kind of man not to take 
care." . The initial defense of negligence as a basis for liability has appeared in the claim that 
the careless "have the power of taking care," but now the objection comes that this may not 
always be true. Given what has preceded it in iii 5, the force of this suggestion is, in effect, 
that carelessness may sometimes be a trait which stands apart from the person as a source of 
action, and is not (or not always), as I have described it, a reflection in rational agents of 
what they value. Everything points to the objector having this limited concern in mind, 
including the fact that the objection comes in response to the introduction of what was by all 
accounts a major legal innovation. 
That it does come in response to this is suggested not only by the fact that the objection 
comes immediately after the claim that responsibility arises through carelessness, but also by 
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the pattern of development running from the MM, through the EE, to the EN.25 In the MM 
treatment of voluntariness (i 16) there is only a comparatively crude treatment of the role of 
knowledge; it is less systematic than the later accounts, more tenative in its lingering over the 
details of illustrative examples, and does not invoke the concept of ignorance (agnoia). The 
EE (ii 9) treatment of these topics, by contrast, is considerably more developed and more 
juridical in tone. The idea of ignorance enters explicitly, and a definition of negligence is 
formulated in terms of it (l225b9-16): 
since science or knowledge is of two sorts, one the possession, the other the use 
of knowledge, the man who has but does not use knowledge may in a sense be 
justly called ignorant, but in another sense not justly, e.g., if he had not used 
his knowledge owing to carelessness. Similarly, one might be blamed for not 
having the knowledge, if it were something easy or necessary and he does not 
have it because of carelessness or pleasure or pain. 
The treatment of these topics in the EN is, finally, the most highly developed of all, and the 
first to contain the substance of the objection and reply that run from 1114a3 to 22. What is 
quite interesting, moreover, is that if we look at what preceeds the discussion of carelessness 
at EN 1113b29-1114a3, namely the observation that individuals and legislators regard wicked 
and noble acts as voluntary (l13b23-29), we see that is has a counterpart in MM 1187aI3-22. 
And if we look at what follows those passages in the MM, we find a counterpart (l187a23-
29) to what comes in the EN immediately after the discussion of carelessness, the objection 
following it, and reply (namely, at EN 1114a23-31, the development of an analogy between 
bodily defects and defects of character). In sum, it looks as though the introduction of the 
idea that negligence suffices for responsibility, together with the objection and reply that 
follow, were inserted into the sequence of the MM between two arguments about 
voluntariness that occur there contiguously. (Neither of those arguments appears anywhere in 
the EE chapters that discuss voluntariness, nor do the objection and reply of the EN appear 
there.) This suggests that what was inserted was inserted as a unit, and that the discussion 
that immediately follows this unit may be only very loosely related to what occurs in it. The 
general impression one gets is that in the MM the idea of negligence does not appear at all, 
in the EE it appears but with no anticipation of likely objections, and in the EN it appears 
with an objection and reply. 
With this in mind, we must devote some attention now to understanding the character of 
. Aristotle's innovation, so we can be clear on why he had very good reason to anticipate 
objections. To do this we must digress briefly to consider the state of the Athenian law 
which he was evidently addressing himself to. 
The Athenian law was in a state of flux and full of unresolved tensions in the fourth 
century when Aristotle turned his attention to it. There were, then, puzzles; and his method 
of inquiry, let us recall, was to "setout the appearances, and first of all go through the 
puzzles" (EN 1145b3-5), thereby preserving the bulk, if a regimented bulk, of the common 
beliefs and practices initially considered. Those puzzles which he would have encountered 
and presumably attempted to resolve, arose from the dominance and subsequent retreat of the 
concept of "pollution". The shedding of blood, even accidentally (and, initially, in childbirth 
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no less than in homicide), was thought to afflict the one who had caused the bloodshed with 
a stain which threatened to defile the polis as a whole,26 and this perceived threat to the 
polis was the basis for making exile the standard punishment. Intentional homicide was 
regarded as worse than unintentional homicide, though by what rationale it isn't clear, and 
the only form of defense considered was an argument to the effect that the defendant had 
not caused the death. The following is a frequently cited case from the Tetralogies, 
attributed to Antiphon:27 
The whole argument centers on the question, Who caused the death? ... A youth 
practising in the gymnasium accidentally hits a boy who runs from among the 
spectators. Nothing is said expressly by either side on the point of the killing being 
accidental. The defense is that the boy, by the act of running into the course of the 
javelin had caused his own death. Aiming at the target was not killing the boy; 
otherwise, the others practising would be equally responsible; it is not because they 
did not throw that they are not liable but because the boy did not run into their 
javelins, and he by his own fault had, however unfortunately, brought his own 
punishment upon himself and thereby absolved the thrower. 
It is interesting that the issue here, in fifth century legal practice, should be the very one at 
the core of Aristotle's thinking on responsiblity. The decisive question in both is whether the 
agent is the source of the thing for which responsibility is to be determined. It is also 
important that the negligence of the victim enters here as a defense, establishing the victim as 
the source of the death, but without negligence being recognized as a distinct basis for 
liability, a basis for viewing a defendant as the source of a death. This created a tension in 
the Athenian standards of liability, inasmuch as accidental killing was regarded as less serious 
than intentional killing, but no distinction of gravity was made between "innocent" accidents 
and those in which culpable carelessness played a role. Another tension arose from the fact 
that outside of the law of homicide, in areas beyond the scope of the concept of pollution 
such as personal injury law, it appears that liability required intentional aggression.28 While 
in the law of homicide, negligence on the victim's part was an adequate basis for regarding 
the victim as having been the "source and cause" of his own injuries, it seems that in other 
contexts negligence was never regarded as sufficient for responsibility. So there was no 
uniform standard of liability in the Athenian law, and we can see Aristotle as attempting to 
introduce one, or at any rate as setting down the first theoretical formulation of one. He 
does this by broadening the concept of fault (in personal injury) so as not to require guilty 
intent, but also by narrowing the scope of liability (in homicide) so that it requires some 
fault. He does this in away, moreover, that develops the act of negligence as a distinct 
category which satisfies his underlying conception of responsibility, being distinguished from 
the category of misadventure (atuchema) (EN 1135blO-25) which does not create liability. 
With this innovation, "Aristotle breaks new ground," the historian of law observes,29 
by distinguishing between consequences which are and those which are not 
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reasonably to be anticipated. There is responsibility for the former; the latter are to 
be treated as accidental. By recognizing that there might be liability for forseeable 
harm without evil intent, Aristotle opened the way for recognition of negligence 
standing beside intention as a separate ground of legal as well as moral culpability. 
VI 
The intended force of Aristotle's response to the objector, then, is almost certainly to 
argue that what is done through carelessness does have its source in the agent, and is a 
reflection and consequence of the agent's defective character. Ideally, he might have argued 
that carelessness is rarely in anyone a fixed and uniformly occurring feature of action infec-
ting every aspect of what she does; that it is selective, rather, and rationally reflects the 
agent's ends, by and large. And he might have argued that this shows itself in what we mean 
in calling someone "careless", namely that she exhibits a tendency to fail to take care with 
respect to what she ought. But perhaps Aristotle is simply taking something like this for 
granted here, that failing to use knowledge already possessed or lacking knowledge that is 
"easy or necessary," on account of failing to handle pleasure or pain properly (EE 1225b 15-
16), is something that has its source in the agent. Assuming that this is the case, we can 
understand Aristotle's purpose here to be to elaborate that part of an account of negligence 
that would pertain to carelessness arising from incapacitation, rather than from an unutilized 
capacity to take care. This seems to be what the critic is demanding, and his strategy in 
answering the critic is to develop what is said of the drunkard into a general model for 
responsibility arising from carelessness owing to incapacity. 
The model is this: the drunkard, because he doesn't care enough about doing what he 
should, lets it come about that he is (voluntarily) in a state (Le., a bodily condition) that 
makes it impossible for him to behave properly. He gives up the control that he normally has 
over means of action. Thus, when he comes to be doing things he ought not to through this 
abdication of control, his conduct is explained by his ends, even though it is not voluntary. 
It is apparently with this model in mind that Aristotle says (EN 1114a4-7), that those who 
don't take care 
are themselves by their slack lives responsible for becoming men of that kind, and 
men are themselves responsible for being unjust or self -indulgent, in that they cheat 
or spend their time in drinking bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on 
particular objects that make the corresponding character. 
The self -indulgent man is careless in that he doesn't even bother to complete his 
deliberations, and Aristotle here gives us an account of the origins of self -indulgent care-
lessness on which the carelessness is owing to the agent's ends, and arises through the media-
tion of the agent's voluntary actions; 
Having come, through generalizing the model of the drunkard, to hold that the 
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carelessness of the self -indulgent or unjust person is self -imposed, Aristotle cannot turn back 
from holding that all vices, as dispositions of character, can be voluntarily acquired. This is 
so because, on the picture he has here, one becomes careless in becoming self -indulgent, for 
instance; the vice and the loss of capacity to take care are inseparable. So if the strategy Aris-
totle adopts is to work, if he is to show that an inability to take care may be voluntarily self-
imposed, he must also show that the vices that generate carelessness can be voluntarily 
acquired. Thus he says (1l14a13-23): 
if without being ignorant a man does the things which will make him unjust, he will 
be unjust voluntarily. Yet it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be 
unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become well on those 
terms. Although he may perhaps, be ill voluntarily, through living incontinently and 
disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not to be ill, but not 
now, when he has thrown away his chance ... So too, to the unjust and to the self-
indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so 
they are unjust voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for 
them not to be so. 
Aristotle says that these vicious states of character are acquired voluntarily. His earlier claim 
(1 1 14a4), that the careless are "responsible for becoming men of that kind," requires that the 
agent who makes himself vicious be already endowed with a character which is neither 
vicious nor securely virtuous, though virtuous it must be. He can't become unjust if he 
already is, and, as we've already established, he can't be responsible for his becoming that 
way unless he already has an enduring, if not secure, state of character. If the man who is 
carelessly self -indulgent is to arrive at his state in the way that the drunkard gives up control 
that he previously had, he must first be capable of choice, and must then make bad choices 
which ruin his character and destroy his capacity for deliberating well. 
The standard reading resists the idea that the agent has a character prior to the one 
voluntarily acquired, on the grounds that on those terms the argument will have gotten no 
where at all. For it is supposed that Aristotle is here trying to make a case for everyone 
having radical responsibility for whatever characters they have. Yet the argument here 
concerns only the acquisition of vices, and the point is to establish that the source of the 
carelessness owing to vice is the agent's ends. Questions concerning the agent's responsibility 
for having the ends he does have not even been raised at this point. 
Aristotle's observation, that vice cannot be reversed once it has taken hold, might also 
seem to be evidence that he thinks of characters as permanent once· having been established; 
and this might in turn be used as further evidence that he is not suggesting in iii 5 that 
agents have one state of character before the one they are said to acquire voluntarily. And 
yet, if the indications in iii 5 are that he thinks it is impossible to reconstruct a character 
once ruined, he shows no signs of thinking that virtue is irreversible. The indications in x 9 
are that he thinks goodness is a state from which many of those who are good are in constant 
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danger of slipping, for otherwise there would be no need of a system of laws "to cover the 
whole of life." Other texts bear this out, including the observations in Rhetoric ii 12-17 on 
the impact of aging, normal life experiences, and gifts of fortune on character, and the 
discussion in EN ix 12 and elsewhere of ph ilia and the influence over one's moral character 
exercised by those whom one loves.30 These influences are described by Aristotle in such a 
way that there can be no doubt that he regards them as forces which can lead to the erosion 
of good character, if not, perhaps, outstandingly firm good character. So the evidence in iii 
5 that Aristotle thinks vice is irreversible is no reason to think that he doesn't view the 
person who voluntarily becomes unjust or self -indulgent as throwing away a more virtuous 
prior state of character. 
Another objection to this reading of 1114a3-31 might be found in the question of 
whether Aristotle really thinks that all vices involve incapacitation of the sort I have 
suggested. If he does not, then my depiction of the progression of the argument doesn't 
cohere, for it depends on holding that Aristotle wants to treat carelessness as a state, arising 
from vice, in which the agent is incapacitated (in somewhat the way that someone who is 
drunk is incapacitated), having brought this on himself in voluntarily becoming vicious; and 
Aristotle does not say here, as perhaps he should on this interpretation, that all vice involves 
incapacitation. Nevertheless, he says as much elsewhere, and there is no indication that he 
does not in iii 5 simply take this for granted. In EN vi 4, for instance, he describes the 
virtue of temperance (s'Ophrosyne) as "preserv[ing] one's practical wisdom or intelligence (s'O 
zousan ten phronesin), and more specifically one's "beliefs about what is to be done" (I140b 
11-15). "For the origin of what is done is that for the sake of which it is done," he says 
(I140b 15-19): 
but the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see any such 
originating principle -- to see that for the sake of this or because of this he ought to 
choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the 
originating principle of action. 
So Aristotle does seem to think of vice as causing a loss of the ability to deliberate from ends 
and act in light of what is good, and this is consistent with the foregoing argument. We might 
also reasonably conclude from this, moreover, that his view must be that an. agent may be 
careless through an unutilized capacity to take care only in the short run or only 
occasionally, since making a practice of it would in time lead to the erosion of deliberative 
capacity. Much negligence· would be associated with incapacitation on this view, but much 
of it, perhaps,- would not be. 
Another important feature of this interpretation of 1114a3-31 is that it is consistent with 
Aristotle's position in x 9 regarding the origins of goodness. For when the influences of 
nurture and occupation are properly regulated they may undercut the agent's claim to credit 
for his having a virtuous character (though he is worthy of praise for what he contributes 
through his own efforts), yet those influences would not in the least undercut the 
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responsibility of someone who comes to have a vicious character despite the conscientious 
efforts of his community. Aristotle indicates that he takes these efforts for granted when he 
argues for the voluntariness of vice, in that the guidance of a relevant authority figures in his 
analogy of the man becoming ill "through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors" 
(l114aI6). He says (l114aI3) that "if without being ignorant a man does the things which 
will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily," but as we have seen he also argues in x 
9 that ignorance of the good (i.e., having no conception of the good) is widespread and must 
be counteracted by careful attention to nurture and occupation. So I take it he would not 
insist that as a matter of fact everyone with a defective character has failed to be virtuous 
voluntarily. Yet he has taken note of what it is fitting for the community and statesman to 
do with respect to fostering moral development, and if he took a conscientious effort in these 
matters to be a precondition for the just imposition of moral or legal sanctions, then he could 
hold that the cases in which vice is involuntary are ones in which blame could not have been 
authorized by the community anyway. If an agent comes through ignorance to have a 
defective character, then the presumption is that this is the community's fault, and it is in no 
position to blame the agent. So he could consistently argue that even though there may in 
fact be many cases of involuntary vice, he has adequately satisfied the objector's demands, in 
showing how agents who are not ignorant of what they are doing can ruin their characters, 
and thus throwaway the control over their actions that they enjoyed in being able to 
deliberate well. 
We may summarize the result of the discussion at 1114a3-31, then, by saying that 
Aristotle there defends the idea that careless action that is neither voluntary nor involuntary 
suffices for responsibility because its source and cause, like voluntary action, is the agent. 
He pursues this defense by trying to show how even negligence in a state of incapacitation 
can be owing to the agent's ends, through the mediation of voluntary actions (and the ruining 
of character) that spring from those ends. The result seems to be a reasonably plausible 
picture of negligence as involving an unused capacity to take care in those who do not make 
a practice of carelessness, but as associated with incapacitation in those who have ruined their 
characters. This is significant as an attempt to articulate and defend a novel standard of 
liability, and, in grasping the significance of this, it becomes clear that we need not interpret 
Aristotle as conceeding that there is no responsibility for what one does without radical 
responsibility for the state of one's character. What he concedes is that if one lacks the 
capacity to deliberate and put one's deliberations into effect, as one does in lacking the ability 
to take care, then one can only be responsible for what one does if one was responsible for 
one's coming to be in that incapacitated state. 
VII 
The second objection in the dialectic of EN iii 5 raises the issue of the agent's 
responsibility for his ends (I I 14a31-:-32): 
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Now some one may say that all men aim at the apparent good but have no control 
over the appearance, but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his 
character. 
Aristotle does not respond to this, as some might expect him to, with the claim that we 
do control what appears good to us. The response he gives is repeated twice in succession (at 
ll14bl-16 and then again at 1114bI7-25), and in both formulations has the structure of a di-
lemma. The second, summary version runs as follows: 
Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each man such as it does 
appear, but something also depends on him, or the end is natural but because the 
good man does the rest excellence is voluntary, vice also will be none the less volun-
tary; for in the case of the bad man there is equally present that which depends on 
himself in his actions even if not in his end. If, then, as is asserted, the excellences 
are voluntary ... the vices also will be voluntary; for the same is true of them. 
Clearly, Aristotle does not think that the previous discussion of the voluntariness of vice 
served to show that agents can choose what ends to pursue, or he would here affirm that 
agents choose their ends. He does not affirm this, but instead entertains it as one of two 
possibilities. The second possibility, "that the end is natural" (and thus, beyond our control), 
is not denied, but rather defused by the observations that acting well and acting badly are the 
same with respect to voluntariness, and that it is in implementing means for the pursuit of 
our ends that we earn credit and blame. 
The first part of this response, that virtue and vice are the same with respect to 
voluntariness, is a partial response to the asymmetry postulated by Socrates in his famous 
paradox, which Aristotle has responded to with the metaphor of begetting just forty-five 
lines earlier. This assertion of symmetry (which has been argued for at 11 lOb 9-15 and 
III la 27-29) has more force than it may appear to have, and is not, I think, the mere (or 
nearly mere) ad hominem that Furley, Gauthier and Jolif belief it to be.31 "It was enough 
for Aristotle to show," Furley writes, "that the Socratic paradox, unqualified, would exempt 
good behavior, as well as bad, from moral appraisal; for this would be fatal to the teaching 
of Socrates and Plato.,,32 It would be fatal to more than that, I think, for it implies that if 
someone wishes to be excused for what she does in pursuing ends over which she has no 
control, then she will have to forego credit for what she does pursuant to those ends. This is 
a telling point to make, so far as justifying actual practices of passing moral judgments is 
concerned, in as much as foregoing credit is probably not a tenable strategy for escaping 
blame, unless one's community is very badly ordered, or one is so alienated from it as to be 
willing to forego all claim to credit. And so, when Aristotle says, at the end of the passage 
cited, "if, then, as is asserted, the virtues are voluntary," he seems to be taking the objector 
to concede in his, the objector's, own terms, that we will all take credit and accept blame 
despite our having only limited control over our ends. And this, of course, is the only 
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socially viable policy one could adopt. We cannot abandon the practice of tracing problems 
to their roots, for this is the kind of phenomenon an inquiry into responsibility is, and it is 
perfectly coherent to hold as Aristotle does, that the way in which we judge a harm to be 
someone's fault is no more suspect than the judgment that a youth is someone's child. 
The second part of the response that Aristotle gives here, that it is in implementing 
means for the pursuit of our ends that we earn credit and blame, is an idea that recurs 
elsewhere in the EN. In i 8, for instance, we are told that "the chief good" consists in 
"activity in accordance with virtue," in the use, and not the mere possession, of virtue; for "as 
in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but 
those who compete" (1098b 31 - 1099a 4).33 And so, likewise, one does not become 
responsible for a harm merely through possessing a faulty conception of the ends of action; 
one can only become the "source and cause" of a harm through one's own activity in pursuit 
of those ends. This, of course, is true; and to make this point is, in effect, simply to observe 
that, given what the word "voluntary" means, our activity in the pursuit of our ends is 
voluntary, in originating in us, even if those ends are not themselves voluntarily acquired. If 
they are our ends, then the conduct and its results has originated in us. Moreover, this adds 
an increment of force to the preceeding argument; for as much as one might be tempted to 
argue that one's ends were, for instance, an accident of birth, there can be little temptation, 
in general, to argue that what one produces through one's own labor is not one's own. 
To summarize Aristotle's response to this second objection, it is clear that all Aristotle 
has asserted, or argued for, is that if virtue is voluntary, then so too is vice. This, and what 
he has said in response to the first objection, is all the argument that Aristotle gives us in iii 
5, and so when in summing up (l114b26-30) he says that the virtues are states of character 
which "are in our power and voluntary," he apparently does not mean that it is entirely up to 
us what ends we are to pursue. He must mean that there is a conditional sense in which 
virtue and vice are both in our power, and that through our voluntary actions we can either 
confirm ourselves in a state of virtue, or fall, through practicing bad habits, into a less 
desirable state of character. He may also mean that in being able to deliberate about the 
things that are "toward," or "contribute to," our ends, we have some ability to chose what 
specific ends we shall act from; but whatever he actually believes about this, we must 
conclude from the restraint he exercises at EN 1114b 17-25, that his views do not imply that 
agents can freely choose their ends. 
VIII 
In conclusion, then, what EN iii 5 contributes to Aristotle's theory of responsibility is not 
just a summary and defense of the practices of attributing responsibility for those things, 
whether good or bad, which have their origin in the persons blamed or praised, but also, and 
very importantly, a restatement and defense of his solution to the puzzles he found in those 
practices as they existed in his time.. In this instance, to save the phenomena was also to 
transform them, not in Athens, perhaps, but in the practices and standards of Roman and 
subsequent law which were influenced by Greek ideas.34 
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NOTES 
l. The passages I cite will follow in large measure, but not entirely, the Revised Oxford 
translations of The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed., J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). Where I diverge it is more for reasons of style then of content. 
The differences between the Irwin and Urmson revised translations of the Nicomachean 
Ethics (EN) and even the differences between them and the unrevised Ross translation, 
make no discernable difference to the argument of this paper, except that the 
interpretive section headings which Irwin has inserted into the text (Nicomachean Ethics 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1985)) are in some cases extremely misleading (e.g., 
throughout 1114a and b). 
2. See, e.g., chapters five and six of Arthur Adkins's Merit And Responsibility (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1960) for an overview and discussion of the relevant sources. I should 
say in passing that as useful as Adkins's book is, he goes astray in much the way that 
others do when he concludes that the position in Greek values accorded to merit makes 
it all but impossible to construct an adequate account of moral responsibility. Much of 
the evidence he tries to call upon would be better conceived of as evidence that it was 
not an explicitly moral form of responsibility that concerned the Greeks. 
3. See, e.g. J. W. Jones, The Law And Legal Theory of the Greeks (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1956), p. 274. All ancient codes of law are dominated by their provisions for the 
redress of wrongs ("torts", to use the English technical term, or in Latin, delicta), those 
wrongs being conceived of as wrongs to individuals, and so not as crimes (crimina), 
which are conceived of as wrongs against the State. (See, e.g., chapter ten, "The Early 
History of Delict and Crime," in Henry Sumner Maine's, Ancient Law (London: John 
Murray, 1894).) Though the modern common law has criminalized many offenses, such 
as assault and violent robbery, which were regarded as delicta by Greek and Roman 
law, there is a continuity between modern tort law and the Roman law of delicta with 
respect to standards of liability. 
4. This distinction depends on either a sharp distinction between failures to conform to 
moral standards and failures to conform to legal standards, or on a distinction between 
different ways of failing to conform to standards (mens rea being required for moral 
responsibility, for instance, but not for some kinds of legal liability), or both. But 
neither of these necessary distinctions seems to have been developed in such a way as to 
support a distinction between moral and legal responsibility. So while Aristotle does 
distinguish between natural justice and legal justice (see ENI134bI8-24), for instance, 
he does not make any use of this distinction in his account of responsibility. 
5. W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 175. 
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6. Ibid. 
7. Terence Irwin, "Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 
ed. A.O. Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 142. 
8. My argument does not depend on the authenticity or dating of the Magna Moralia 
(MM), but my policy will be to call attention to passages from the MM which, insofar as 
it can be considered authentic, do tend to confirm my interpretation of the EN. I do 
regard the MM as authentic, moreover, on the strength of arguments that appeal to the 
apparent philosophical development running from the MM, through the EE, to the EN; 
and (contrary to, e.g., Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978)) I regard the EN, together with the Politics and Rhetoric, to be the 
consummate expression of Aristotle's ethical views. On the authenticity of the MM, see 
Max Hamburger, Morals And Law: The Growth 0/ Aristotle's Legal Theory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), a book cited by legal historians but neglected by 
philosophers, and John Cooper, "The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," 
American Journal 0/ Philology 94 (1973): 327-49. I agree with Cooper's observation (p. 
328) that "on some issues the simpler treatment found in the Magna Moralia presents 
more adequately a basic insight which the other, more elaborate treatments tend to 
obscure." 
9. As I shall explain at greater length later, this was owing originally to the fact that the 
question, when a violent death (phonos) had occurred, was who had caused the death 
(who was aitos phonou). A defendent could not escape punishment except by showing 
that he was not aitos phonou. 
10. Hardie, op cit. 
11. See David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," in A. Rorty op cit, pp. 221-
240, esp. p. 225. 
12. As Gail Fine has suggested in "Aristotle on Determinism: A Review of Richard 
Sorabji's Necessity, Cause, and Blame," The Philosophical Review XC, (1981), pp. 561-
579. It is worth noting that Sorabji (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) cites four 
passages~ in which human actions or animal movements are described as necessitated: EN 
l14a27, a 30; Met. ix5, 1048a14; Mvt. 0/ Animals 9, 702b24; Poet. 7-10. These 
examples, and many others, he says, "are ones which we would class as cases of causal 
necessitation. This is not one of Aristotle's categories. But he too groups many of the 
cases together, under the heading of 'natural necessity.' At pp. 150-54, Sorabji suggests 
that the way to reconcile this with Aristotle's denials of necessity, is to view those 
denials as a carelessly sweeping way of making "several comparatively modest points," 
such as, e.g., that "we cannot exhibit a result as necessary, if we merely refer, as the 
Presocratics did, to matter or material cause." Yet he concludes that Aristotle believes 
that human action is caused but necessitated. Gail Fine offers in her review a different 
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reconciliation which preserves the conclusion that Aristotle regarded actions from choice 
as causally necessitated. Though I cannot address the relevant issues at any length here, 
I think this conclusion is borne out by the evidence from Met. ix, as well as from the 
Mvt. of Animals, and the Physics and De Anima on self-movers (see, e.g. David Furley, 
"Self-Movers," in A. Rorty op. cit., pp. 55-68) 
13. The suggested resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's own formulations is 
the only one possible, I think, given the role of carelessness and acting in ignorance in 
his thinking about responsibility. The sections ahead will make this clear. 
14. See e.g., Hamburger, op cit., p. 33. 
15. See, e.g., the paper of Irwin's cited in note 7. Irwin's final formulation of Aristotle's 
analysis of moral responsibility occurs on page 132: "A is responsible for doing x if and 
only if (a) A is capable of deciding effectively about x, and (b) A does x voluntarily." 
16. My reading of Aristotle on this point is essentially the same as Gary Watson's in 
"Skepticism About Weakness of Will," The Philosophical Review LXXXVI, No.3, (1977), 
pp. 316-39. 
17. It follows from this that it is not a mistake to take the source of responsible action to be 
deliberative desire always, if we understand by this desire that is appropriate to the 
balance of the agent's ends, and consciously deliberated about to the extent it would be 
rational to deliberate about it. So it isn't necessary to hold, as Irwin does, that the 
identity of the moving principle must be left open in order to avoid a formulation that 
is too restrictive (Le., that would rule out "appetite, anger, sudden passion or impluse 
[as] possible causes of voluntary and responsible actions" (Irwin, op. cit., 131). 
18. Ibid, pp. 140-141. 
19. See, e.g. DA 432a7; Sent. 445b16; and A.Pst. 81a38, which are cited by Jonathan Barnes 
in "Aristotle's Concept of Mind," in Articles On Aristotle, Vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. 
Schofield and R. Sarobji, (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 39. 
20. . Another passage in which Aristotle argues, that one "must have been brought up in good 
habits" (emphasis added) if one is to be receptive to learning about justice and nobility, 
occurs in EN i 4 at 1095b4-6. 
21. At EN 1179b25-30 he praises the Spartan state for its "attention to questions of nurture 
and occupation," adding that "it is best that there should be a public and proper care for 
such matters." Politics vii and viii develop further the themes that common practices in 
these matters are deficient and that education should be public. 
22. lowe this last observation regarding the limits of legislation to Martha Nussbaum's 
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book, The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
which I've encountered since first developing the argument of this paper in my Ph.D. 
thesis, Towards A Theory of Moral Responsibility, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. At p. 
347 she argues that "even in a good and stable culture, because of economic necessity 
there will always be those who, living the life of manual laborers, will be debarred by 
the exigencies of their daily work from having the education that is requisite for full 
human excellence," citing Pol. 1278aO-l, "If one is living the life of a craftsman or 
hired servant, it is not possible to practice the things belonging to excellence." 
23. Commentators have taken the standard reading of iii 5 and criticized Aristotle for 
supposedly failing to realize that early training would be a threat to responsibility for 
character. See e.g., D. J. Finley, "Aristotle on the Voluntary," in Articles On Aristotle, 
Vol. 2: Ethics & Politics, J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, (London: 
Duckworth, 1977), p. 53. Clearly Aristotle did realize this, and it is the commentators 
who err in failing to look for other interpretations of iii 5. 
24. Another recent attempt to defend Aristotle, when read as arguing that people are 
(generally or universally) responsible for their state of character, appears in T. Engberg-
Pedersen, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), at p. 240 
f. It is claimed that an adult, engaged in activity that he realizes will reinforce a given 
state of character, can make the non-rational desiderative state that he either already has 
or is about to create his own. He will 'create' himself as a certain type of person in the 
full sense" (p. 249). It is hard to see how this differs from saying that one can make 
one's peace with who one is, or what one is becoming, where this is a stance of 
acceptance or accommodation one can take, but can also refuse to take. It is harder still 
to see any connection between this and Aristotle's notion of responsibility. 
25. My awareness of this pattern of development owes a lot to Hamburger, op. cit., pp. 15-
32. At p. 26 he concludes: "The least juridical exposition is that of MM; in EE the 
juridical tone is more pronounced; in EN the argument is eminently legal. This is 
hardly in harmony with the thesis that Theophrastus and his school gave to MM its 
peculiar juridical tinge." 
26. Jones, op cit., p. 255. 
27. Recounted by Jones, op cit., p. 262. 
28. Ibid., p. 269. See also Roscoe Pound, An Introduction To The Philosophy of Law (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), pp. 78-80. 
29. Jones, op cit., p. 274. Jones equates the category of negligence with mistake 
(hamartama). but hamartama as Aristotle describes it is a narrower category than the 
one he has previously identified as falling between the voluntary and the involuntary 
and involving ignorance originating i~ the agent. 
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30. Nussbaum gives an illuminating treatment of these passages, op. cit. at pp. 336-340 and 
362-365, and argues that even the Priam passage at EN 1100b33-110IaI3, which seems 
to constitute countervailing evidence ("no blessed (makariotes) man can become 
miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean."), actually supports 
this conclusion that "Aristotle plainly does believe that our worldly circumstances affect, 
for better or worse, adult circumstances affect, for better or worse, adult good character 
itselr' (p. 336); that he "does not believe that there are any really invulnerable people" 
(p. 387). The argument occurs at pp. 328-33 and 337, and focuses on what is suggested 
by the remark (EN 110la 11-13) that " ... nor, if he has had many great misadventures, 
will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete 
one in which he has attained many splendid successes." 
31. D. J. Furley, "Aristotle on the Voluntary," in Articles On Aristotle, Vol. 2: Ethics and 
Politics, op. cit., pp. 47-60. R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, Aristotle: L'Ethique a 
Nicomaque (Louvain, 1970). 
32. D. J. Furley, op. cit, pp. 52-53. 
33. See Nussbaum, op. cit., pp. 324, 25 on this point. 
34. See Jones, op. cit., PI' 312 e.g. lowe thanks to Mary-Louise Gill, Peter King, and an 
anonymous referee for the Philosophical Review for comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. All of them helped me correct errors which I would otherwise have made. 
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